



Another straw on the camel’s back: COVID-19 in Mali 











The spread of COVID-19 in Mali represents a new challenge after years of instability, 
security threats and endemic corruption. The fragility of the health system and the limited 
measures taken to contain the disease might lead to severe consequences, while fearing 
further economic distress. At the same time, social and political tensions are rising and 
the legitimacy of President Keïta is put into question by a group of political opponents, 
the Mouvement du 5 Juin, led by a prominent religious leader. 
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 of March 2020, the Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 
officially announced the first two cases of COVID-19 in the country. However, 
despite the outbreak of the pandemic, the President confirmed the date of the 
legislative election, scheduled for March 29. The scrutiny, initially planned in 
2018, had already been delayed due to security threats. In a certain sense, this 
suggests Coronavirus is just another straw on the camel’s back, a back which 
seemed already about to collapse (or probably had already done it) since 2012, the 
year of the Touareg rebellion in the northern part of the country.  
Mali currently counts 1,809 Coronavirus cases and 104 deaths
1
. These figures, 
while apparently limited if compared to many other countries, need to be analysed 
in the light  of Malian instability, tensions and poverty – this latter due, among 
other causes, to the continuous terrorist attacks, in particular on behalf of jihadi 
groups – and of its endemic corruption, which has severely affected all public 
services and in particular the health system. 
 
2. Malian health system 
 
Malian health system was not prepared to face COVID-19. It is considered one 
of the weakest health systems in Africa, due to its high levels of corruption
2
. 
According to Boubacar Haidara, 700 billion Franc CFA (which correspond to 
1,13 billion euros) were misappropriated between 2005 and 2017
3
. Furthermore, 
the health system and public services in general did not experience any relevant 
improvement in recent years, as the leading classes – instead of getting medical 
care in Mali – prefer to travel to Maghrebi or European hospitals. This practice, 
known as “medical tourism”, affects negatively the whole system, as the élites in 
command are not interested in its improvement. The experience of Coronavirus 
and the prohibition to travel abroad to get medical care, which is valid also for the 
richest part of the population, may make them understand the importance to 
reform it
4
: the process already started a few months after the beginning of the 
pandemic.  
                                              
1
 This article was written on 15th June 2020. World Health Organization, 
https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/ml. 
2
 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping Risk Factors for the Spread of COVID-19 in Africa, 
3 April 2020, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-risk-factors-spread-covid-19-africa/. 
3
 B. Haidara, L’experience malienne dans la gestion de la pandémie du Covid-19, in The 
Conversation, 18 May 2020, https://theconversation.com/lexperience-malienne-dans-la-gestion-
de-la-pandemie-du-covid-19-138158. 
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According to the Ministry of Health, at the beginning of the crisis the Country 
counted only 40 intensive care beds and 56 ventilators
5
. Furthermore, there were 
only 2,500 tests available and four testing centres, all of them located in the 
capital, Bamako
6
. It was only on 31
st
 May, more than two months after the first 
two cases were acknowledged, that the Minister of Health Michel Sidibé 
announced on Twitter a mobile laboratory had been taken to Timbuktu in order to 
make tests accessible to a greater part of the population and control the 
contagion
7
. In such a contigency, Malian relations with China were crucial: the 
Country sent facemasks and medicines. Moreover, 60 ventilators were ordered to 
the Chinese supplier Mindray and 400 beds were offered by a Chinese enterprise 




3. Containment measures  
 
Due to the fragility of the health system, Mali had to adopt a series of measures 
in order to avoid the spread of the virus. The first one was implemented a few 
days before the first two people tested positive: on 18
th 
March, the Superior 
Council of National Defence suspended all flights coming from countries affected 
by COVID-19, with the only exception of cargo flights
9
. In addition, during the 
25
th
 March speech, the President announced the enforcement of several 
containment measures, among which a curfew between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. and the 
prohibition of gatherings of more than 50 people
10
. However, mosques remained 
opened and no social distancing measure were required
11
, in order to avoid 
tensions with the Islamist actors during the election period. Restaurants, pubs and 
dance clubs had to stop their activity but they did not receive any economic aid on 
behalf of the State
12
. The situation was even worse for those who worked in the 
                                              
5
 O. Marbot, Nombre de lits de réanimation et de respirateurs: où en est l’Afrique?, in Jeune 
Afrique, 8 April 2020, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/924087/societe/nombre-de-lits-de-
reanimation-et-de-respirateurs-ou-en-est-lafrique/. 
6
 Communiqué de démenti du gouvernement à Agence France Presse (AFP) relatif au nombre de 




 Tweet by Michel Sidibé, Minister of Health and Social Affairs of Mali, 31 May 2020, 
https://twitter.com/MichelSidibe/status/1266884013190455296. 
8
 O. Marbot, Nombre de lits de réanimation et de respirateurs: où en est l’Afrique?, cit.; Tweet by 
Michel Sidibé, Minister of Health and Social Affairs of Mali, 12 May 2020; 
https://twitter.com/MichelSidibe/status/1260213865746440192. 
9
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informal economy (the 73% of the population, according to the International 
Labour Organization
13
) with an almost inexistent system of social protection.  
Moreover, the government adopted policies that appealed to the civic sense of 
the population, emphasising the relevance of single citizens’ correct behaviour to 
minimize the pandemic. In particular, the Minister of Health announced on 3
rd
 
June a campaign – held in cooperation with UNICEF – to raise awareness on 
protective measures. 36 tricycles will ride around the capital Bamako and explain 
residents how to protect themselves from the spread of the Coronavirus
14
. This 
will take place in a context of similar operations, such as the un malien, un 
masque project (one Malian, one face mask) where free face masks were 
distributed to the population
15
.  
However, there are limits to the containment measures that can be implemented 
in a country whose economic situation is far from stable. A balance has to be 
found between the need to protect the population and the one to safeguard the 
economy; especially when the possibility to grant governmental economic aid is 
quite limited. To give an example: free electricity and water were provided for 




. Unfortunately, many other 
citizens did not have access to this benefit, as it was effective only for tariffs 
between 0 and 50 kWh and maximum 10 m
3
 of water, without taking into 
consideration the number of members of the household
17
.  
The pandemic might severely affect the Country. Incomes are expected to 
decrease, in particular in the agricultural sector, which covers 1/3 of the GDP
18
. 
Due to measures that limit the circulation of goods, prices will rise and –  as 
COVID-19 related economic difficulties spread all over the world –  transfers of 
money from the diaspora, which form between 7% and 12% of the GDP, will be 
reduced
19
. The combination of these factors will increase the need of food aid. 
While, before the pandemic, it was estimated that 4 million Malians (1/5 of the 
total population) would need food aid in 2020, this number might more than 
double with the crisis
20
, and would further worsen if grasshopper invasion – 
which has been devastating Eastern Africa’s crops in the last months –, reaches 
Western Africa in the next weeks
21
. 
                                              
13
 International Labour Organization, Activities of the employment intensive investment programme 
in Mali, https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-intensive-investment/countries/WCMS_3 
27090/lang--en/index.htm. 
14
 Tweet by Michel Sidibé, Minister of Health and Social Affairs of Mali, 3 June 2020, 
https://twitter.com/MichelSidibe/status/1268098629505626113. 
15
 COVID-19 | Un malien, un masque!, in Primature, 5 June 2020, http://primature.ml/covid-19-
un-malien-un-masque/. 
16
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President Keïta had to rely on international solidarity: in mid-April the 
International Monetary Fund reduced Mali’s debt along with the one of other 24 
countries. The President is also asking a moratorium on the debt and a plan of 
coordinated multilateral response, together with other African Presidents and 





4. Increasing social and political tensions 
 
While at an international level Mali is benefiting from good multinational 
cooperation, at a domestic one its government is still facing multiple challenges. 
Firstly, the security issues that continue to threaten Malian population, in 
particular in the centre and north of the country. Secondly, but not less 
importantly, there are two other problems: the teachers’ strike and the political 
opposition.  
For what concerns education, tensions are not the result of the pandemic, but of 
an older process that dates back to the adoption of article 39 of the 16
th
 of January 
2018 Act, which states that any increase in the remuneration of public officials 
would be applied also to the teaching personnel
23
. Since its approval, in order to 
obtain the rigid application of the law, a series of long-lasting strikes were held, 
the last one starting on the 21
st 
of January 2020. In that occasion, participation to 
the strike was so high that the government had to start recruiting 15,300 voluntary 
teachers
24
. Then came the pandemic, schools were closed in order to reduce the 
spread of the virus and strikes had to stop. On the 2
nd
 of June, examination classes 
went back to school, and teachers’ union started to boycott the classes
25
. 
Meanwhile, Mali is also facing a political crisis. As aforementioned, on the 25
th
 of 
March, while announcing the first two cases of COVID-19, the President 
confirmed that the parliamentary election was still going to happen, with the 
adoption of protective measures. This decision was probably made, among other 
reasons, in order to follow the recommendation of the national inclusive dialogue 
and to apply the Algiers Peace Agreement, signed with the Touareg movements in 
2015
26
. However, on the same day, the opposition party Union pour la République 




 F. Backman, COVID-19 en Afrique: le Mali malade, cit. 
23
 N. Chahed, Mali: La marche des enseignants dispersée par la police à Bamako (médias), in 
Anadalu Agency, 11 March 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-marche-des-
enseignants-dispers%C3%A9e-par-la-police-%C3%A0-bamako-m%C3%A9dias/1762547. 
24
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et la Démocracie (URD) announced that its leader Soumaila Cissé had gone 
missing after campaigning near the town of Niafunke, in central Mali
27
. One of 
his bodyguards had been killed, two others wounded and there were no news on 
Cissé himself
28
. Despite this event, the ballot still took place, and more than two 
months after his kidnapping, there was still no information on Cissé’s 
whereabouts. Additionally, in central Mali, al-Qaeda’s affiliates intimidated 
people not to vote, the president of a voting station was removed, while the 
representatives of the electoral commission were chased away, as reported by Al 
Jazeera
29
. In northern Mali, voting was cancelled after some terrorists’ threats, and 
after voting equipment was destroyed by unknown assailants
30
. As a result, 
participation rate was low: the turnout after the second round was of 35.2% in the 
country and of 13.17% in the capital, Bamako. The President’s party – 
Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) – ended up winning the elections, while 
simultaneously 15 seats in the National Assembly
31
. Besides, the outcome of the 
election was disputed and, despite Keïta’s hope to avoid an institutional crisis, he 
seems to have lost his legitimacy.  
 
5. The islamisation of the contestation 
 
In this situation, the opposition started to play an important role. In fact, in 
order to understand Malian politics, it is necessary to consider that religious 
leaders have a central role, as in the State 90% of the population is Muslim
32
. 
Political forces need the help of religious leaders, as they manage to obtain the 
support of the population much more effectively than the traditional parties do
33
. 
Three main leaders are worth considering: Chérif Ousmane Madani Haidara, 
Chèrif Bouyé Haidara and, as a crucial figure for the latest events, imam 
Mahmoud Dicko.  
Chérif Ousmane Madani Haidara, currently president of the Haut Conseil 
Islamique Malien, founded more than 25 years ago the Ançar Dine movement 
(which is not the terrorist group present in northern Mali), representing an 
alternative to the Salafi hegemony
34
. He supported Keïta during the 2013 election 
                                              
27












 F. Backman, COVID-19 en Afrique: le Mali malade, cit. 
32
 World Population Review, Mali Population 2020, 
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/mali-population/. 
33
 F. Backman, COVID-19 en Afrique: le Mali malade, cit. 
34
 G. Holder, Chérif Ousmane Madani Haidara and the Islamic Movement Ansar Dine, in Cahiers 
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but has now become one of his main detractors
35
. A similar pattern of initial 
support and later opposition is the one of Chérif Bouyé Haidara, who tries to 
restore order when tension rises, as happened when imam Dicko wanted to 
organise a march in support of Malian teachers on strike three months ago
36
. Last 
but not least, imam Dicko, former president of Haut Conseil Islamique Malien, is 
the main religious opposition leader, who continuously criticises the government 
and Malian endemic corruption. He represents a group of quietist Salafi Islamists 
but he concurrently promotes the development of a dialogue with jihadi terrorists 
groups
37
. He has had a strong political influence for years. In 2010 he managed to 
stop a reform of the family code
38
. Nowadays – with his political movement, 
Coordination des mouvements, associations et sympathisants de l’imam 
Mahmoud Dicko – he is leading the Mouvement du 5 Juin – Rassemblement des 
forces patriotiques du Mali. This is a group of opponents to the incumbent Malian 
president, which also includes the coalition of opposition parties Front de la 
Sauvegarde de la Démocratie and Espoire Mali Koura, a civil society 
movement
39
. They organised a manifestation in Bamako on the 5
th
 June 2020, 
which saw a very high number of supporters, to ask the President’s resignation. 
Most people were there to support imam Dicko, to the point that Bakary Sambé, 
the director of Timbuktu Institute in Dakar, commented: «He managed to do 
something enormous: the islamisation of the contestation. He is an Islamic-
nationalist, demagogic but structured rallying point»
40
.  
The success of the manifestation was irrefutable: on the 7
th
 of June, Dicko and 
his partners had already opened the discussions with the representatives of 
MINUSMA, CEDEAO and African Union. Furthermore, they were already 
organising another protest for the 19
th
 of June.  
 
6. Increasing social and political tensions 
 
In such a tense situation, President Keïta had to react. He did it on the 14
th 
of 
June, by making an address to the nation in which he proposed some measures to 
face current Malian problems. He decided to change the direction of the 
                                              
35
 F. Backman, COVID-19 en Afrique: le Mali malade, cit. 
36
 G. Aimé Eblotié, Au Mali, l’imam Bouyé Haidara convainc son homologue Dicko d’annuler sa 
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government, still led by Boubou Cissé, and make it a «government of change»
41
. 
The President’s idea is to make limited reforms that might improve the conditions 
of the health system, put an end to the teachers’ strike and avoid his resignation. 
Firstly, he stressed that the health system will be the priority of this new 
government and called for the elaboration of a plan to modernise Bamako’s 
hospitals
42
. Secondly, he asked the government to find an agreement with the 
teachers’ union to put an end to the crisis, though he did not provide any guideline 
on how to do it. Lastly, he stated to be ready to start a dialogue with the 
Mouvement du 5 Juin and promised further announces would have followed 
regarding the core issues of the 5
th
 of June protests. 
In conclusion, unfortunately the Coronavirus has not been the one and only 
problem that Mali has been facing in the last months. It has for sure worsened the 
conditions of the country and clearly shown which where the most important 
issues to address, from the weakness of the health system to the limited political 
legitimacy of the government and the President. On the bright side, this difficult 





                                              
41
 Adresse à la Nation : IBK promet : « la résolution de la crise scolaire » et se dit « ouvert au 
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